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The  Civil  Service  refers  to  the  body  of  officials  who  carry  out  functions  of 
government under the direction and supervision of the head of government [Rahman 
(1998), p.  2]. Excluded in this definition are employees of state-owned enterprises, the 
army, teachers, the judiciary and the police who, together with civil servants, collectively 
constitute the public sector. It is the civil service, and not the public sector, which will be 
the focus of this paper. 
Civil  Service  arrangements  have  emerged  as  important  mediating  institutions 
which interface between the state and its citizens. Traditionally these were monolithic, 
centralised, powerful structures with immense power over the management of the affairs 
of a nation, and often not very responsive to the changing needs of governance and public 
management. 
However,  in  recent  times  many  governments  have  realised  the  importance  of 
greater  efficiency  (both  economic  and  functional)  in  the  delivery  of  services  to  their 
citizens.  Thus  governments  in  different  parts  of  the  world  have  initiated  large-scale 
reform  in  their  civil  services  to  achieve  greater  efficiency,  effectiveness  and 
responsiveness.   
MODES OF GOVERNANCE 
In  practice  good  governance  involves  promoting  the  rule  of  law,  tolerance  of 
minority and opposition groups, transparent political processes, an independent judiciary, 
an impartial police force, a military that is strictly subject to civilian control. A free press 
and vibrant civil society institutions, as well as meaningful elections. Above all, good 
governance means respect for human rights. 
The three modes of governance considered are governance through state authority 
and governance through the market. These modes are self-explanatory in themselves, so I 
will go through them very briefly.  
Governance through State Authority 
This concept of governance is the most widely known form of governance and it is 
particularly  relevant  to  our  society,  where  the  government  is  the  major  constitutive  
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element  of  the  governance  process.  It  underlines  the  important  role  of  the 
state/government in providing the regulatory environment and institutional underpinning 
to  facilitate  efficient  market  exchange.  For  example,  without  courts  to  interpret  and 
enforce agreements, commercial life would become chaotic; without laws to define, and 
police  and  courts  to  enforce  them,  property  rights  would  be  non-existent.  Thus, 
governance through this mode takes place through the interplay of a host of institutional 
arrangements and policy strategies that the state puts in place. 
Thus, state governance cuts across all modes of governance and is central to the 
effectiveness of the entire system of governance.  
Governance through the Market 
The  most  basic  form  of  governance  here  is  through  the  forces  of  competitive 
markets,  i.e.,  through  market  exchange  and  the  price  mechanism.  Under  this  mode, 
therefore, the balance of governance and coordinating functions shifts towards greater 
reliance  on  markets,  private  allocation,  and  contracting.  Economic  activity  is  largely 
determined  by  the  forces  of  supply  and  demand,  acting  to  a  large  degree  in  a  self-
regulating fashion. 
However,  markets  are  never  freestanding.  Effective  competition  in  markets 
requires considerable attention to the codification and enforcement of the ‘rules of the 
game’  if  anti-competitive  and  arbitrary  behaviours  are  to  be  avoided.   As  already 
explained only state can provide these institutions. It is in this context that the state will 
always be an important constitutive element of any form of market governance.  
WHAT CONSTITUTES ‘GOOD GOVERNANCE’? 
Lack  of  transparency  in  governance  often  leads  to  wrong  political,  social  and 
economic  decisions  many  of  which  affect  Civil  Service  Reforms.  Having  defined 
governance and the modes by which it may be executed, the next challenging task is to 
address the issue of what constitutes ‘good governance’. In line with the definitions of 
governance  above,  ‘good  governance’  can  be  said  to  materialise  if  the  state  is  able, 
through  the  power  and  authority  vested  in  it,  to  allocate  the  nation’s  resources,  and 
coordinate economic activities in an optimal manner. The notion of optimality connotes 
efficiency and effectiveness. It means that governance is conducted within the framework 
of effective rules and policies that underpin social harmony and sound development. In 
the context of state governance, good governance implies the capacity to formulate and 
implement  sound  economic  policies,  to  institute  effective  legal  institutions,  to  ensure 
public oversight and participation of civil society, and to have in place a credible civil 
service that provides citizens with an acceptable level of public services in an effective 
and efficient manner.  
These constituents of good governance must, however, be gauged against certain 
predetermined  criteria.  According  to  Soesastro  (2000),  good  governance  is  widely 
identified  with  the  following  attributes:  transparency,  accountability,  efficiency  and 
fairness.  These  are  the  ground  rules  of  governance,  which  must  be  used  to  assess 
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operates effective policies and laws, but it also  means, and more importantly,  that it 
executes those policies and laws of the state in a transparent, accountable, predictable, 
efficient and fair manner.  
CIVIL SERVICE REFORMS 
Civil Service Reforms need to be an integral part of good governance processes if 
sustainable solutions to currently existing issues within the ambit civil services delivery 
are envisaged. 
Within this context, there seems to be some justification for the perception that 
civil service reforms may be part of a mainstream agenda in Pakistan. This is evidenced 
by  the  initiation  of  processes  such  as  the  creation  of  a  Committee  for  Civil  Service 
Reforms, the establishment of a Civil Service Reform Unit in the Establishment Division, 
launching of the Professional Development Agenda and the more recent announcement 
of the reform package for introducing good governance in the country by the Ministry of 
Law  and signaling  the importance of  this area of reform by soliciting  help from the 
multilateral  development  agencies.  Within  this  context,  five  points  are  worthy  of 
consideration. 
Bridging the Colonial-contemporary Lag: Replica on the colonial system, the 
core  functions  of  Pakistan’s  civil  services  are  administrative  control,  collection  of 
revenue, exercising control through regulatory checks and in the case of its expanded 
definition to public services, active engagement in service delivery. 
Exceptions notwithstanding, this model has little relevance to the problems of the 
public  sector  today  which  relate  to  harnessing  the  entire  resources  of  the  economy 
towards  the  goal  of  development.  The  public  sector’s  limitations—owing  to  lack  of 
resources and management issues—therefore underscore the need to develop interface 
arrangements, with organisations that could facilitate achieving this goal.  Such interface 
arrangements, which have to do with establishing partnerships with the private sector for 
providing sustainable outcomes warrant a paradigm shift in reconfiguring the role of the 
public sector. This would entail ‘exercising administrative control’ through participatory 
decision-making in evidence-based frameworks, ‘enforcing regulation’ through setting of 
standards,  an  unbiased  approach  to  ensuring  compliance  with  these  standards  and 
assurance  through  strengthening  peer  organisations  as  we  move  to  new  models  of 
financing  and  delivering  services  and  implementing  frameworks  for  public-private 
partnerships. 
This would require major institutional changes in the present arrangement of civil 
service operations. Reconfiguring to meet this goal is the first challenge that the civil 
service reforms will have to address. 
The Incentives-accountability-performance Nexus: Many a times, civil service 
reforms  are  considered  as  being  synonymous  with  incentive  building.  Clearly 
incentives—albeit  linked  to  performance—must  be  a  priority  to  bridge  the  current 
disparity  between  the  current  public-sector  salaries  and  the  public-sector-accepted-
market-rate for professionals, which is evidenced by what consultants ‘within’ the public 
sector  are offered.  However,  it  must  be  recognised  that  lack  of  capacity  is  clearly  a 
constraint on the ability to act on these incentives. This highlights the need for instituting 
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Promotion and Pay and Pension Reforms currently on their way to being implemented. 
However, capacity building must be needs-based and targeted. The current three-pronged 
capacity building initiatives inclusive of the Professional Development Programme, the 
Executive Development Programme and revamping of the existing training institutions 
must pay careful attention to the local context of capacity building at the strategic and 
operational levels. 
Building capacity for performance must be approached in cycle with creating an 
environment to enhance performance and the incentive-performance link completed by 
factoring-in  accountability  into  the  equation.  This  highlights  the  needs  for 
institutionalising transparent managerial audit within public sector institutions at various 
levels. Careful attention should also be paid to developing appropriate instruments for 
assessing performance. 
Currently, the Annual Confidential Report is the chief instrument for assessing the 
performance of public officials in Pakistan; however it is widely perceived that it is not 
an effective instrument for promoting accountability and is also reportedly used as a 
means of exploitation.  
Civil Service Reforms to Reorientate Institutional Culture: Civil Service 
Reforms should not just be about incentives for performance, about reforming a line 
for service or about compensation of bureaucrats. The reform process must focus on 
governance in its broader context and enhancing efficiency in the delivery of public 
services  in  a  conducive  institutional  culture—a  culture  geared  in  the  outcomes—
efficiency  context  rather  than  being  focused  on  short  term  gains.  Therefore,  in 
addition personnel management reforms which go beyond personnel action and set 
standards for performance and build mechanisms for their assessment and rewards 
there  is  a  need  to  pay  attention  to  transparent  regulation  and  minimising  vested 
interests, political benefaction and interference in decisions, particularly in relation 
to  recruitment,  transfers  and  disciplinary  actions  as  these  are  perceived  as  an 
impediment  to  efficiency  within  the  system,  in  addition  to  being  a  demoralising 
factor within the public sector. 
From  Civil  Service  to  Public  Service  Reforms:  The  current  focus  on  ‘civil 
servants’ within the context of ‘service reforms’ is understandable given that it is seen as 
an instrument for mainstreaming second generation macro-economic reforms. However if 
this  is  to  translate  into  improved  social  services  delivery,  other  cadre  and  ex-cadre 
categories of public servants must be brought within its ambit. 
One of the challenges posed to service delivery in the area of health and education 
relates  to  human  resource—low  numbers  for  certain  categories,  migration  of  skilled 
workers,  misdistribution  of  workforce,  staff  absenteeism,  dual  job  holding,  lack  of 
motivation to perform and the proverbial brain drain are manifestations of the lack of 
economic opportunities and incentives often complicated by other factors. These must be 
at the heart of a strategic reform process rather than ad hoc measures. 
Devolution  vis-à-vis  Decentralisation:  Civil  Service  Reforms  to  improve 
governance must also have an added context given that social service delivery is now 
devolved to Districts Governments who have little experience of such responsibility in 
the past. This underscores the need for the reform efforts to pay close attention to two 
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sliding scale with capacity as a due consideration. In the second place, it is important to 
build appropriate safeguards against several issues which have been brought to attention 
during the initial years of implementation of the Local Government Ordinance of 2002. 
For example, Provincial Governments still retain influence over establishment decisions 
and have considerable de facto control over recruitments, career management, transfers 
and termination. It has also been shown that political and administrative decentralisation’ 
has also paradoxically created ‘centralisation’ of some functions within the district itself 
as the DCO now has centralised control over all the staffing decisions vis-à-vis EDOs. In 
addition discrepancies in reporting relationships are also worthy of note in the context of 
the need to address them. 
Many  reforms  measures  are  presently  on  their  way  to  being  structured  and 
implemented  in  many  sectors—of  these  the  Police  Reforms,  Judicial  Reforms,  and 
reforms introduced by the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority and the National 
Anti Corruption Strategy have been announced and there may be others, in the pipeline. 
A reform agenda in the health sector has also been tabled by the Pakistan’s Health Policy 
Forum.  However  it  must  be  clearly  understood  that  the  success  of  all  these  reform 
measures and others that may be in the pipeline will depend not only on the manner in 
which they pay due attention to human resource solutions—within the civil service—but 
also within the broader context of human resources.   
Rationale and Objectives of CSR 
The overall objective of Civil Service Reform (CSR) is to improve the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the public sector.  Since civil servants (and other public employees) 
are ultimately responsible for delivering government services, and since these workers 
constitutes  a  sizeable  proportion  of  government  expenditure,  CSR  focuses  special 
attention on—but is not limited to—human resource management (HRM) activities.   
Many large-scale CSR initiatives are motivated by a desire to reduce or contain the 
public-sector wage bill in order to:  
(a) Free up  resources  for  other  governmental  objectives (i.e.  direct  transfers of 
wealth, or investments in social and physical infrastructure).  
(b) Reduce government deficits.  
(c) Improve service delivery.  
(d) Create a more welcoming environment for private sector activity.   
A  second  major  objective  of  CSR  is  to  improve  the  motivation,  skills  and 
effectiveness of the government workforce.   International experience shows that poor 
HRM policy, procedures or practice can result in the wrong quality or quantity of staff, 
low  levels  of  staff  morale,  high  incidence  of  absenteeism  and  turnover,  and  poor 
individual  and  departmental  performance.  Therefore,  HRM  reforms  have  become  an 
integral component of comprehensive CSR initiatives.  
A third type of objective of CSR is to improve the quality of performance and the 
effectiveness of the public administration as an instrument for (changing) policies:  
(a) Make  public  sector  agencies  more  responsive  to  the  needs  and  views  of 
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(b) Make public sector agencies more directly accountable for their performance 
and/or more manageable and flexible.  
Public Opinion of Civil Services  
The  common  man  in  most  countries  perceives  the  civil  services  system  to  be 
inefficient, corrupt, lacking in innovative abilities and unwilling to change. The general 
perception of civil service in Asia is depicted in the following table:  
Public Perceptions of Civil Service in Asia
2 
Country  Public Perceptions of Civil Service 
Bangladesh  Civil service is inefficient and ineffective, inadequately representative, 
non-responsive to social and political demands, unfair and unhelpful to 
clients,  unaccountable  for  its  actions,  overly  cautious  in  handling 
administrative business, inclined towards unethical practices, overpaid 
for the work it does, overstaffed and unreliable. 
India  Civil servants as ‘status quoists’, and lacking in innovation, initiative, 
empathy  or  the  drive  for  change.  The  service  is  perceived  to  be 
overstaffed, wasteful, over-cautious, unfair, non-responsive and corrupt 
(also see Table 1). 
Japan  Although  the  Japanese  civil  service  has  made  important 
contributions  to  the  industrialisation  of  the  country  and  is  widely 
respected overseas as hard-working and loyal, public opinion is still 
critical  of  the  service  because  domestic  public  expectations  have 
outstripped civil service performance. Corruption scandals involving 
senior Japanese bureaucrats have also damaged the public image of 
the civil service. 
South 
Korea 
The  civil  service  was  ‘the  hero’  of  Korean  industrialisation  and 
liberated the people from poverty, but the public has not given much 
credit  to  the  heroes.  Although  civil  servants  are  neither  lazy  nor 
wasteful,  they  are  inefficient  and  not  effective  enough  to  please  the 
public.  The  civil  service  is  also  overstaffed.  With  economic 
development has come rising expectations for service and probity that 
the civil service has thus far been unable to meet. 
The 
Philippines 
A growing cynicism about the way graft and corruption in the civil 
service with the authorities lacking the political will to fight corruption. 
Corrupt  officials  are  given  an  easy  way  out  and  those  guilty  of 
corruption continue to hold high office. 
China  Public’s image of civil services in relatively of low esteem as compared 
to other professions. 
 
 
2Burns, John P. and Bidhya Bowrnwathana 2001, Civil Service Systems in Asia. Cheltenham, UK: 
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Public’s Image of Various Professions in China (%)
3 
Profession  Very Good (%) 
Scientific and Technological Personnel  50.1 
Teacher  44.6 
Military Cadre  42.6 
Armed Police  41.6 
Lawyer             38.5 
Airline Worker             35.7 
Author  35.1 
Discipline-inspection Cadre  34.6 
Medical Personnel  34.3 
High-level Cadre  31.4 
Customs Officer  28.5 
Public Security Cadre  28.5 
Railroad Worker  26.9 
Office Management  26.1 
Reporter  26.1 
Party Cadre  22.7 
Government Cadre  22.8 
Mid-level Cadre  20.4 
Basic-level Cadre  18.8 
Tax Collector  12.6 
Industry/Commerce Administrative Personnel  9.8 
 
Civil Service Transformation Model
4 
The nature of the Civil Service of a country and analyse the change being created 
by reforms. It has two core dimensions: state-society relations and the key characteristics 
of Civil Service systems. Each of these dimensions in turn are defined in terms of two 
parameters: 
State-society relations are expressed according to the degree of institutionalisation 
of the nation state, measured by its degree of cohesiveness and shared commitment to 
basic  procedures  and  practices;  aggregated  public  attitudes  to  the  state.  Are  public 
attitudes mostly pro-state, that is, does the public generally believe in the legitimacy of 
state competence? Or are they more anti-state, that is, does the public believe that strict 
limits should constrain the domain of government action.  
The civil service system can be expressed in terms of:   
(a) the relative value placed by the service on process or outcomes; and   
(b) the degree to which the service is politicised or managed with professionalism.   
3Burns, John P. 2001, ‘The Civil Service System of China: The Impact of the Environment’, in Burns, 
John P. and Bidhya Bowornwathana. Civil Service Systems in Asia. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
4Morgan, E. P. 1996. ‘Analysing Fields of Change: Civil Service Systems in Developing Countries’, in 
Bekke, A. J. G. M., J. L. Perry and Th. A. J. Toonen (eds). Civil Service Systems in Comparative Perspective. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 227-46, cited in Burns, John P. and Bidhya Bowornwathana. 2001. 
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Superimposed on one another, the two dimensions and four parameters produce a 
four-part box for assessing the change necessary to reform the civil service of a country. 
The four quadrants in the box represent:   









Inchoate State Institutional State
Professionalism
V  
Quadrant  I-the  pragmatic  field—The  state  is  highly  institutionalised,  public 
opinion  is  basically  anti-state  and  the  civil  service  is  more  professional  and  process 
oriented (example, the USA).  
Quadrant  II-the  patrimonial  field—The state  is  relatively  ‘inchoate’  or  non-
institutionalised, public opinion is still basically anti-state and the civil service is more 
politically responsive, but still process oriented (example, Nigeria).   
Quadrant III-the positivist field—The state is relatively highly institutionalised 
and  the  public  shares  a  more  pro-state  orientation,  while  the  civil  service  is  more 
outcomes oriented and professional (examples, France, Japan and South Korea). 
Quadrant  IV-the  absolutist  field—The  state  is  less  institutionalised,  but  the 
public is relatively more pro-state while the civil service is more outcomes oriented and 
politically responsive (China during 1949-66).   
As a country undertakes reforms, the state-society relations change and as civil 
services become more professional, countries move from one field to another. Moreover, 
variation within fields is great. Marginal cases in each of the four fields tend to cluster 
towards the middle of the respective continua, suggesting that they could be in one of 
several fields.  
CIVIL SERVICE REFORM UNIT 
The  Government  of  Pakistan  has  an  ambitious  and  comprehensive program of 
reforms  to  accelerate  growth  and  poverty  reduction.   A  Civil  Service  Reform  Unit 
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also amended the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance to institutionalise merit-
based,  transparent  recruitment  for  the  civil  service.  While  there  has  been  some 
improvement,  as  a  result  of  on-going  reforms,  Pakistan’s  civil  service  still  requires 
systemic renewal and structural changes. 
The  creation  of  the  political  structure  for  devolution  began  in  2001  with  the 
creation of a new local government structure consisting of over 6,400 new indirectly 
elected  local  governments.  Administrative  reforms  include  the  creation  of  district 
governments with the District Coordination Officer (DCO) established as the highest-
ranking  civil  servant  in  the  district.  District  governments  have been  given  functional 
responsibility for delivering key services, including education and health care along with 
the rights to  raise additional revenues. While there are early signs that devolution  is 
beginning to yield positive results, it is also clear that much remains to be done. 
Weaknesses in tax policy and administration have long been identified as being 
among Pakistan’s most serious challenges. Collusion between taxpayers and tax officials 
has been pervasive and facilitated by the discretionary powers of tax officials, complex 
tax rules, and weak supervision of staff. A fundamental change in tax policy began in 
July 2002 with the introduction of a system based on Universal Self Assessment with 
risk-based audit and record keeping to minimise taxpayers’ interaction with tax officials. 
Beginning  with  a  highly  publicised  effort  to  prosecute  high  profile  cases  of 
corruption, including public officials and the influential, the government has made anti-
corruption  a  key  element  of  its  governance  agenda.  Building  on  these  efforts,  a 
comprehensive  
National  Anti-Corruption  Strategy  (NACS)  was  approved  in  2003,  with  three 
elements: education and awareness to reduce tolerance for corruption; prevention through 
improved  management  and  governance  to  reduce  the  need  and  opportunities  for 
corruption; and better accountability mechanisms to further strengthen deterrence. 
The  government’s  reform  programme  in  public  financial  management  is  well 
underway. The timeliness of financial statements has improved along with the reliability 
of data. There has also been considerable progress in improving the timeliness of audits 
over the past two years—reports are available within one year of the end of the fiscal 
year.  While  demonstrating  progress  on  the  above  points,  less  progress  has  been 
demonstrated in the development of Public Accounts Committees (PACs)—especially at 
the National level, and in addressing the shortcomings in public procurement 
The Government of Pakistan has contracted a US$ 55 million IDA Credit under 
the  Public  Sector  Capacity  Building  Project.  (PSCBP)  The  project  has  several  sub-
components,  out  of  which  the  largest  is  Establishment  Division’s  sub-component.  In 
order to implement the sub-component of Establishment Division, a Civil Service Reform 
Unit (CSRU) has been established within the Establishment Division. 
The Unit will also serve as Secretariat to the Cabinet Committee on Civil Service 
Reforms  which  will  oversee  GOP’s  comprehensive  civil  service  reform  programme. 
CSRU will formulate and present technical recommendations in order to support civil 
service reform through outsourcing technical studies and organising Seminars/Workshops 
by involving all the stakeholders at the provincial and national level to develop consensus 
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Barriers to Civil Service Reform in Pakistan 
In  general,  the  more  comprehensive  and  complex  the  process  of  reform 
undertaken, the greater the management capacity required for successful implementation.  
However, since such management capacity is often in short supply—and typically in 
great  demand—securing  the  involvement  of  government  officials  with  the  requisite 
managerial expertise can be difficult. 
To  succeed,  civil  service  reforms  require  some  measure  of  support  and 
involvement  from  current  civil  servants.   Yet  the  uncertainty  and  potential  loss  of 
privileges  which  are  associated  with  civil  service  reform  initiatives  can  cause  civil 
servants  to  resist  (or  not  actively  cooperate)  with  the  process  of  planning  and 
implementing reforms. 
Reform initiatives are often viewed as an outside imposition, and resisted as such, 
especially  when  they  are  associated  with  larger  structural  adjustment  programmes 
required by international lending authorities (e.g. World Bank and IMF).  
Enabling Conditions for Civil Service Reform  
Explicit political support and involvement from high-level government officials 
for the duration of the reform process is required. Reform initiatives are more likely to 
succeed if led by a reform implementation agency with adequate prestige, authority, skill 
and technical competence.   
Reform programmes are more likely to be successful when defined in terms of 
specific goals and pursued on the basis of a well-defined strategy which pre-specifies the 
means, timing and sequencing of actions and which honestly reflects institutional realities 
and constraints. 
Effective communication with all key actors and stakeholders (including citizens) 
who have an interest in the process or outcome of civil service reform is critical.   
Reform initiatives must be grounded and led by the experience and expertise of 
local authorities to be successful.   While external parties may lend critical advice and 
technical  assistance,  reform  initiatives  that  are  not  “owned”  by  local  authorities  are 
unlikely to succeed or be sustainable.      
Main Elements of Civil Service Reforms   
The main elements of civil service reform centred on:  
(a) Changing the role of government from regulator to facilitator, with an emphasis 
on refocusing and narrowing of overall responsibilities.  
(b) Identifying regulatory constraints to investment and other economic activities.  
(c) Improving delivery of services to the people, and making efforts for simplified 
rules and procedures, decentralisation and delegation.   
(d) Identifying alternate systems  of delivery arising from the delineation of  the 
areas to be vacated by government, by increasing attention to the scope for 
privatisation,  various  forms  of  public-private  partnerships,  and  formalised 
consultative mechanisms with various stakeholders.  
(e) Emphasising  the  entrepreneurial  role  of  the  government,  through 
commercialisation  of  infrastructure,  laying  down  performance  standards, Good Governance Approach to Civil Service Reforms  631
costing and marketing of government products and services, and delivery of 
services at the operational level.   
(f) Matching revenues and costs, improving financial planning and management 
systems, securing value for money in government.  
Shift in the Government’s Role 
From  To 
A Major operator in many sectors of the 
economy 
A  prudent  facilitator  of  private  sector 
activity  in  sectors  best  operated  by  the 
private sector, and provider of services in 
other sectors 
A  regulator  and  controller  of  most 
economic  decisions in  many  sectors (for 
example pricing policies) 
An enabler of market-based development 
through  conducive  deregulated  policy 
environment 
Direct  top-down  administration  and 
centralised decision-making 
Enabling,  empowering  and  ensuring 
participation  of  local  administration  and 
de-centralised decision-making 
 
Recruitment and Retention of Personnel 
The  effective  performance  of  a  civil  service  depends  on  sound  recruitment, 
selection and retention practices.  Low morale, high turnover, extreme civil service wage 
bills, and poor service quality are common to government administrations that fail to 
attract, retain and motivate high-quality civil servants.  
HRM Reform through Decentralisation 
To avoid the inflexibility and delays common to many centralised civil service 
personnel systems, some governments decentralise various human resource management 
(HRM) responsibilities to individual ministries, newly established Executive Agencies or 
regional government entities.   
Successful devolution of Human Resource Management activities can lead to:  
(a) Reduced delays in recruitment.  
(b) Better matches between candidates and specific departmental needs.  
(c) Increases in staff retention and reductions in absenteeism.  
(d) Improved staff and management morale.   
(e) Increased cost-effectiveness in meeting organisational objectives.  
(f) Key Challenges and Trade-offs. 
It  is  difficult  to  strike  an  appropriate  balance  between  consistency  in  HRM 
practices  across  government  agencies  and  the  need  to  provide  greater  flexibility  to 
individual agencies. It is important to recall that traditional, centralised recruitment and 
hiring practices were designed to limit corruption and patronage and to cultivate an esprit 
de corps among civil servants.   However, the tight regulations and procedures used to 
meet  these  objectives  sometimes  result  in  long  delays,  rigidity,  and  failure  to  meet 
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candidates and employees.  These limitations, in turn, can lead to inefficiencies and poor 
service delivery.  At the other extreme, complete decentralisation of HRM functions can 
inhibit cross-departmental movement of personnel, result in variability of standards and 
employment terms, and potentially permit the continuation of biased hiring or promotion 
practices.   
One  common  mechanism  for  achieving  balance  in  this  regard  is  to  gradually 
devolve  HRM  responsibilities  to  separate  ministries  or  Executive  Agencies  within 
guidelines established by a Federal Public Service Commission, or its equivalent.   
When decentralising HRM functions, two additional challenges should be kept in 
mind.  First, going to the “market” to recruit mid and upper level managers may be costly 
and difficult in Pakistan, especially where international donors have “bid-up” salaries for 
(the limited number of) talented professionals who possess the skills and desire to work 
in the public sector. In some developing countries, doing away with the enforcement of 
uniform  recruitment  practices  may  create  additional  opportunities  for  patronage  and 
corruption.   
Merit as the Basis of Recruitment, Selection, and Promotion 
Merit-based  recruitment  and  promotion  involves  the  specification  of  objective 
criteria related to qualifications, experience and ability to achieve organisational goals as 
the basis for decisions concerning entry into (or advancement within) the Civil Service. 
Merit-based systems strive to ensure the recruitment and selection of the “best” and most 
capable candidates,  thereby assisting  efforts to  attract, secure and retain  professional, 
high-quality civil servants.   
Merit-based systems share two basic features—transparency and contestability.  A 
merit system fulfils the requirement of transparency when the criteria used for selection 
and promotion decisions are made known to the public and are open to scrutiny.   The 
condition  of  contestability  is  established  whenever  mechanisms  exist  that  permit 
perceived violations of merit-based hiring or promotion decisions to be reviewed and 
challenged. 
A hiring or promotion decision should be based on merit if it meets all of the 
following criteria:  
(a) An  assessment  is  made  of  the  relative  suitability  of  the  candidates  for  the 
duties, using a competitive selection process;  
(b) The  assessment  is  based  on  the  relationship  between  the  candidates’  work-
related  qualities  and  the  work-related  qualities  genuinely  required  for  the 
duties;   
(c) The assessment focuses on the relative capacity of the candidates to achieve 
outcomes related to the duties; and   
(d) The assessment is the primary consideration in making the decision.  
Types of Merit-based Civil Service Systems 
There  are  two  broad  categories  of  merit-based  civil  service  systems—career 
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Career systems—involve the application of merit criteria at the entry point into 
the civil service.  To enter a closed career civil service system applicants are required to 
take  a  standardised  entrance  exam  and/or  be  in  possession  of  certain  (academic) 
credentials or professional experience.  These “screening” techniques identify candidates 
who possess the base level of knowledge and aptitude deemed necessary for successful 
performance as civil servants.  In a traditional career civil service system, competitions 
for  most  middle  and  senior-level  positions  are  closed  to  candidates  outside  the  civil 
service.   
Position-based system—Under this system, recruitment and hiring practices aim 
to ensure that the best-suited candidate for each position is found and selected, whether 
from within or outside the civil service.   
Many countries are moving to develop hybrid system which combines elements of 
both career, and position-based civil service systems.    
TRAINING AND CAREER MANAGEMENT 
Effective training, professional development and career path management for civil 
servants  improves  professional  competence,  employee  morale,  and  organisational 
learning.  Consequently, successful reforms in these areas can substantially increase the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the public service. 
The link between staff training and development and the overall effectiveness of 
the public service is made more salient by the following trends:  
(a) The accelerating rate of organisational and technological change requires staff 
to acquire new skills and attitudes throughout their career in the public service.  
(b) Pressure  to  reduce  public  sector  wage  bills  can  lead  to  hiring  freezes  or 
reductions in personnel. Staff that remains after the implementation of wage 
control initiatives is often required to assume additional responsibilities and 
perform  a  broader  range  of  tasks.  To  do  so  effectively,  staff  may  require 
extensive training, coaching and mentoring.  
(c) Rising public expectations of the public serve require staff to possess sharper 
technical skills and more responsive, service and outcome-oriented attitudes.  
(d) Continuing  public  and  fiscal  pressure  for  demonstrated  efficiency 
improvements on the part of the public sector will require staff at all levels to 
make use of business planning and strategic management skills.  
(e) Providing  opportunities  for  professional  development  and  training  increases 
the  overall  attractiveness  of  working  in  the  public  sector  and  thus  assists 
recruitment and retention efforts.  
On-the-Job Training and Professional Development 
Opportunities  for  training  and  professional  development  can  frequently  be 
provided  to  staff  “on-site”  or  within  the  context  of  their  everyday  jobs.   Rotational 
assignments, peer reviews and managerial briefings are three common types of on-the-job 
training made available to staff by governments around the world.   These formalised 
learning experiences are distinguished from the informal learning which takes place in 
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knowledge and skills is a primary (as opposed to secondary or incidental) objective of 
these assignments.  
Rotational Assignments 
By exposing staff to new activities and experiences, rotational assignments allow 
staff to develop new skills.  Rotational assignments also permit staff to develop broader 
professional networks, a process which can lead to personal professional development 
and  improved  organisational  performance.  Although  rotational  assignments  are 
traditionally confined to the public service, some governments have developed cross-
sector exchange programmes. A private-public sector exchange programme permits civil 
servants in Japan to spend three years in the private sector, while a similar programme 
exists in Korea.  
Peer Reviews 
Participating in and being the subject of peer reviews provides an opportunity for 
staff to identify individual and organisational “deficiencies” that require adaptation and 
learning.  While  peer  review  may  focus  on  diagnosing  areas  for  improvement,  the 
challenge  of  appropriately  evaluating  one’s  peers  is  in  itself  a  unique  opportunity  to 
refine communication, analytical and social skills.  
Briefings 
Whether they are of a technical, strategic or procedural nature, effective briefings 
by management often aim to further develop staff’s ability to integrate process and apply 
information and knowledge.    
Ensuring a Corruption-free Civil Service 
Corruption prevails where there is ample opportunity for corruption at little cost. 
Incentive structures encourage corrupt behaviour. Anticorruption strategies therefore aim 
at reducing the opportunities for corruption while increasing the expected cost, i.e. the 
risk of being caught and severely punished.
5 
Applying  this  to  anticorruption  programmes  means  to  move  beyond  public 
administration  and  financial  management  reform  to  look  at  broader  structural 
relationships, including the internal organisation of the political system, the relationship 
between the state and firms, and the relationship between the state and civil society.  
There is a strong correlation between the extent of government involvement in the 
economy, and the amount of corruption. Also, the extent of corruption in a country is 
governed by the structure of its public services, particularly their selection and promotion 
processes, and their wage scales comparative to the private sector. According to a 1996 
survey of  two thousand  enterprises across forty-nine countries,  a higher  incidence of 
corrupt  practices  are  found  in  countries  with  more  regulatory  and  bureaucratic 
requirements for business.   
5Marong, Alhaji B. M. 2002. Toward a Normative Consensus Against Corruption: Legal Effects of the 
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The  more  administrative  discretion  officials  enjoy  in  approving  regulatory 
requirements  such  as  the  issue  of  permits,  licenses,  or  grants  of  fiscal  exemption  to 
business, the more the likelihood of corruption.  
Investors view bribery as a private tax on their investment, and tend to shy away 
from jurisdictions with high rates of “private taxation”.  
Bribery increases the transaction costs of doing business in particular jurisdictions. 
The effect has been lower inflows of foreign investment to countries with high rates of 
corruption.   
Impact of Corruption on Entrepreneurship and the Economy 
There is a negative correlation between the amount of corruption and the level of 
investment in a country. A country which improves its standing on the corruption index 
by one standard deviation (on a scale of 0 to 10 where 0 is the most corrupt and 10 the 
least  corrupt),  will  experience  an  increase  in  its  rate  of  investment  by  about  four 
percentage points. The improvement by one standard deviation in a country’s corruption 
index would translate to an annual growth rate of over half a percentage point in per 
capita Gross Domestic Product.
6 
Corruption  leads  to  negative  consequences  for  both  producers  and  consumers. 
Firms that have to bear the cost of corruption are unable to shift the entire burden of 
corruption to the consumers since the latter resist such a move by reducing the amount 
purchased. Thus the total quantity sold declines and the price rises.  Some or all firms are 
forced to reduce production while some others close down altogether to being about a 
reduction in total production. A part of consumer, as well as producer surplus are taken 
over by corrupt officials. Therefore, both consumers and firms share the cost of any 
bribes.  
Public servants often customise government policies to facilitate receiving bribes 
or  other  illicit  payments.  Thus,  government  policy  and  expenditure  are  prioritised 
towards capital-intensive infrastructure, defence, and cognate supply type contracts that 
offer  opportunities  for  rent-seeking  and  kickbacks,  instead  of  socially  desirable  and 
needed health, education an public welfare projects.  
As  a  public  office  offers  ample  opportunities  to  get  rich  quick  there  is  stiff 
competition to gain such an office and much effort and material resources are be spent in 
this pursuit.  
Singapore—In  Singapore  the  anti-corruption  strategy  is  based  on  both  the 
incentives and reducing opportunities to get corrupt. The incentives focus on high salary 
structure, and deterrent through strong legal provisions. The Prevention of Corruption 
Act (POCA) provides to the government additional powers of arrest, search of arrested 
persons, and examination of bank accounts and other assets of those civil servants under 
investigation.  
Hong  Kong—Hong  Kong  has  set  up  an  Independent  Commission  Against 
Corruption  (ICAC)  which  has  wide  investigative  powers  and  its  officers  cannot  be 
transferred to any other department or post. Its advisory committees are all chaired by 
eminent non-officials and all reports are made public. The ICAC sponsored a massive,  
6Taslim,  M.  A.  1994.  Corruption  and  Entrepreneurship.  The  Journal  of  Bangladesh  Development 
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well-education campaign against corruption. Even concerts and sporting events, fostering 
social interaction, have anti-corruption as the main theme. 
India—India  has  set  up  the  institution  of  Lokpal  to  examine  the  cases  of 
corruption at the top. But most of the existing State laws authorise the Lokpal merely to 
tender advice and the government is not bound to accept the advice.  
CONCLUSION 
Pakistan’s civil service has been following the British model, but now it is being 
professionalised.  Rank-based  system,  the  generalists  are  preferred  to  specialists,  and 
lifetime employment is provided to its incumbents.  
The common man in most Asian countries perceives the civil services system to be 
inefficient,  corrupt,  lacking  in  innovative  abilities  and  unwilling  to  change.  Lack  of 
transparency often leads to wrong socio-economic and political decisions, many of which 
affect Civil Service Reforms. 
Good governance involves promoting the rule of law, tolerance and a transparent 
socio-economic and political processes and an independent judiciary. Above all, good 
governance means respect for human rights. 
There is a need to change the role of government from regulator to facilitator, with 
an  emphasis  on  refocusing  and  narrowing  of  overall  responsibilities,  and  improving 
delivery of services to the people, and making efforts for simplified rules and procedures, 
decentralisation and delegation.  
A  Civil  Service  Reform  Unit  oversees  the  implementation  of  reforms  in  civil 
service,  while  the  Federal  Public  Service  Commission  is  entrusted  to  institutionalise 
merit-based, transparent recruitment for the civil service.  
The other facet of civil service is the strong correlation between the extent of 
government involvement in the economy, and the amount of corruption. Also, the extent 
of corruption in a country is governed by the structure of its public services, particularly 
their selection and promotion processes, and their wage scales comparative to the private 
sector. 
Civil servants need effective training and career development, which would result 
in  better  organisational  and  individual  performance.  The  structure  of  civil  service 
performance appraisals should be around core competencies, with specific goals for the 
coming review period to increase core competencies. 
Civil  servants  need  to  be  retained  on  the  basis  of  the  adequacy  of  their 
performance and inadequate performance should be corrected. Those who cannot or will 
not improve their performance should be separated from service.  
Civil Servants are to be protected against arbitrary action, personal favouritism, or 
coercion for partisan political purposes; prohibited from using their official authority or 
influence for the purpose of interfering with or affecting the result of an election or a 
nomination for election; and be defended against reprisal for the lawful disclosure of 
information which the employees reasonably believe evidences a violation of any law, 
rule, or regulation. 